Abstract. We study congestion games where players aim to access a set of resources. Each player has a set of possible strategies and each resource has a function associating the latency it incurs to the players using it. Players are non-cooperative and each wishes to follow a strategy that minimizes her own latency with no regard to the global optimum. Previous work has studied the impact of this selfish behavior on system performance. In this article, we study the question of how much the performance can be improved if players are forced to pay taxes for using resources. Our objective is to extend the original game so that selfish behavior does not deteriorate performance. We consider atomic congestion games with linear latency functions and present both negative and positive results. Our negative results show that optimal system performance cannot be achieved even in very simple games. On the positive side, we show that there are ways to assign taxes that can improve the performance of linear congestion games by forcing players to follow strategies where the total latency suffered is within a factor of 2 of the minimum possible; this result is shown to be tight. Furthermore, even in cases where in the absence of taxes the system behavior may be very poor, we show that the total disutility of players (latency plus taxes) is not much larger than the optimal total latency. Besides existential results, we show how to compute taxes in time polynomial in the size of the game by solving convex quadratic programs. Similar questions have been extensively studied in the model of non-atomic congestion games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of the efficiency of taxes in atomic congestion games.
Introduction
We study the well-known atomic congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [1973] . In these games, players aim to access a set of resources. Each player has a set of possible strategies (corresponding to sets of resources) and each resource incurs some latency to the players that are using it. Players are noncooperative in the sense that each of them acts selfishly and wishes to follow a strategy that minimizes the latency she experiences with no regard to the global optimum. Previous work has extensively studied the impact of this selfish behavior on system performance. In this article, we study the question of whether, and by how much, the performance can be improved if players are forced to pay taxes for using resources. We consider atomic congestion games with linear latency functions and present both negative and positive results.
ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES.
In an atomic congestion game (or, simply, a congestion game) there is a set E of resources and a set N of n players. Each player i has a positive unsplittable demand (or weight) w i and a set of actions P i ⊆ 2 E (each action of player i is a set of resources). Each resource e has a nonnegative and non-decreasing latency function e defined over nonnegative numbers. A resource e used by players with total demand z causes a latency of e (z) to each of them. Players are noncooperative and each wishes to minimize her own cost (the cumulative latency experienced at the resources used) with no regard to the global optimum. Network congestion games can be used to model noncooperative users in a communication network, where each user i aims to communicate an amount of traffic w i through a least congested single path connecting two particular nodes s i and t i . In this setting, resources correspond to network links and the actions of user i are all the paths connecting node s i to t i .
In general, players follow mixed strategies, that is, player i selects a probability distribution y i = {y i p | p ∈ P i } over her actions. Mixed strategies where y i p ∈ {0, 1} are called pure strategies, while mixed strategies where y i p ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} are called semi-pure strategies. Each player is aware of the strategies selected by all other players. We denote by y ie the probability that player i uses resource e. Clearly, y ie = p∈P i :e∈ p y i p . We use the term, assignment, to refer to the vector of players' strategies. In a pure (respectively, semi-pure) assignment, all players follow pure (respectively, semi-pure) strategies. Given an assignment y, we denote by L i p (y; ) the expected latency of player i when selecting action p. Then, the expected latency of player i is L i (y; ) = p∈P i y i p L i p (y; ). An assignment y is a (mixed or pure) Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her strategy, that is, L i (y; ) ≤ L i (y −i , x i ; ) for any player i and for any probability distribution x i over the actions in P i , where y −i , x i denotes the assignment obtained by y when player i deviates from y i to x i . The weighted total latency defined as W (y; ) = i w i L i (y; ) has been used as a measure of performance of assignment y in game . Another natural measure of performance is the total latency defined as T (y; ) = i L i (y; ). The price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999; Papadimitriou 2001] (with respect to the weighted total latency) of a game is the maximum of the ratio of W (y; )/W (x; ) where y is a Nash equilibrium and x is any assignment for . Similarly, we may define the price of anarchy with respect to the total latency. We use the terms unweighted and weighted for congestion games in order to denote whether players have equal weights or not. Clearly, in unweighted congestion games, the weighted total latency equals the total latency. Czumaj and Vöcking [2007] , Fotakis et al. [2002; , Gairing et al. [2004] , Koutsoupias et al. [2003] , Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999] , Mavronicolas and Spirakis [2007] study various games that can be thought of as special cases of congestion games with respect to the complexity of computing equilibria of best/worst social cost and the price of anarchy when the social cost is defined as the maximum latency experienced by any player. These include linear congestion games, that is, games with latency functions of the form e (z) = α e z + b e with nonnegative constants α e and b e , and load-balancing games, that is, linear congestion games where the actions of players are singleton sets. In load balancing terminology, we refer to the resources of a load balancing game as machines. The performance measure of the weighted total latency has been studied in Awerbuch et al. [2005] , Caragiannis et al. [2006] , Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [2005b] , Lücking et al. [2008] , Suri et al. [2007] . Awerbuch et al. [2005] and, independently, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [2005b] prove tight bounds on the price of anarchy of congestion games. Among other results concerning polynomial latency functions, they show that the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in unweighted linear congestion games is 5/2 while for mixed Nash equilibria or pure Nash equilibria of weighted players it is 2.618. Bounds on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria were proved to be tight even for load balancing games [Caragiannis et al. 2006 ] while better bounds exist only for load balancing games on machines with identical latency functions [Caragiannis et al. 2006; Suri et al. 2007] . Lücking et al. [2008] study symmetric load balancing games where all machines are actions for all players.
1.2. TAXES. In order to mitigate the impact of selfish behavior on system performance, we introduce the notion of taxes levied on resources. We use a tax function δ : E × Q + → Q + that assigns a tax δ e (z) to each player of weight z that wishes to use e. Assuming selfish behavior of the players, we obtain a new extended game ( , δ) where each player now aims to minimize the expected latency she suffers plus the taxes she pays. The tax paid by player i when selecting action p is i p ( , δ) = e∈ p δ e (w i ). Given an assignment y, the expected tax paid by player i is i (y; , δ) = p∈P i y i p i p ( , δ) . Again, y is a Nash equilibrium for the extended game if no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her strategy, that is,
We use two measures of performance in the extended game ( , δ) extending the measures of total latency and weighted total latency in congestion games without taxes. The total cost of an assignment y is T (y; , δ) = i (L i (y; ) + i (y; , δ)), while the weighted total cost of an assignment y is W (y; , δ) = i w i (L i (y; ) + i (y; , δ)).
Motivated by Cole et al. [2006] , we distinguish between refundable and nonrefundable taxes. In the former case, we assume that the collected taxes can be feasibly returned (directly or indirectly) to the players (e.g., as a "lump-sum refund") and therefore do not contribute to the overall system disutility. However, refunding the collected taxes could be logistically or economically infeasible; the latter case models this scenario. Definition 1.1. A function δ : E × Q + → Q + is a ρ-mixed-efficient refundable tax for the congestion game with respect to the total latency (respectively weighted total latency) if T (y; , 0) ≤ ρ · T (x; , 0) (respectively W (y; , 0) ≤ ρ · W (x; , 0)) for any mixed Nash equilibrium y in the extended game ( , δ) and any assignment x. A function δ : E × Q + → Q + is a ρ-mixedefficient nonrefundable tax for the congestion game with respect to the total cost (respectively, weighted total cost) if T (y; , δ) ≤ ρ · T (x; , 0) (respectively, W (y; , δ) ≤ ρ · W (x; , 0)) for any mixed Nash equilibrium y in the extended game ( , δ) and any assignment x.
Similarly, we define ρ-pure-efficient refundable and nonrefundable taxes by constraining y to be a pure Nash equilibrium. We use the terms pure-optimal and mixed-optimal to refer to 1-pure-efficient and 1-mixed-efficient taxes, respectively.
The bounds on the price of anarchy of congestion games with respect to the weighted total latency can be also expressed using the above definition. Any tight bound of ρ on the price of anarchy over mixed (respectively pure) Nash equilibria implies that the trivial tax function that assigns no tax to the resources is ρ-mixed-efficient (respectively ρ-pure-efficient) and no better in general. Another issue which is related to our study is that of network design for selfish players (or resource removal). In this setting, the question is whether the performance of the game can be improved by removing some of the resources; this is equivalent to a tax function which assigns to each resource a tax of either 0 or ∞ for all players. Azar and Epstein [2005b] prove that deciding whether resource removal for a weighted linear congestion game can yield price of anarchy better than 2.618 is NP-complete. Furthermore, there are games where this is not feasible at all, implying that taxes of this type are not better than 2.618-pure-efficient.
The problem of computing optimal taxes has been extensively studied in the economics and transportation science literature; the focus of these studies is on the model of nonatomic congestion games [Roughgarden and Tardos 2002] . The main difference of these games from the atomic ones we study in the current paper is that each player controls an infinitesimally small demand related to the total demand on the system, thus, the actions of a single player have negligible effect on the system performance. This difference is substantial enough so that the related results (see Cole et al. [2003 ], Fleischer et al. [2004 , Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [2004] and the references therein) do not carry over to our model. In fact, even nearly-optimal taxes do not always exist in atomic congestion games. Furthermore, in our model, we allow more general taxes than those considered in the context of nonatomic or atomic splittable games, that is, the tax that a player i pays in order to use a resource e depends on the player's weight w i . Such a distinction cannot be made in non-atomic or unweighted atomic congestion games where the demands (respectively, weights) of the players are identical. In addition, as we will show, this definition is crucial in order to obtain efficient taxes with respect to the total latency objective.
1.3. OUR CONTRIBUTION. In this article, we focus on linear atomic congestion games and show the following results (a summary is also presented in Tables I  and II) . First, we exploit solutions of convex quadratic programs to compute 2-mixed-efficient taxes for congestion games with respect to both the weighted total latency and the total latency. Both bounds are tight. Note that the first result beats the lower bound of 2.618 [Awerbuch et al. 2005] on the price of anarchy while when the total latency is of concern, the price of anarchy is unbounded. For unweighted congestion games, we present a universal tax function by showing that, for a particular value of the parameter τ that is shown to be best possible, the function δ e = α e τ is (1 + 2/ √ 3)-pure-efficient, thus beating the lower bound of 5/2 [Awerbuch et al. 2005; Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005b] on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria. This is an interesting result since the tax function does not depend at all on the game played on the resources; it depends only on the resources themselves. We also study symmetric load balancing games, where we show how to compute pure-optimal taxes for unweighted players. This result holds for arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions; in this article we give a short proof of a slightly weaker statement concerning arbitrary strictly increasing latency functions. Furthermore, we present lower bounds stating that optimal taxes may not be feasible even in very simple games. In particular, there are unweighted load balancing games on identical machines that do not admit (11/10 − )-pure-efficient taxes, weighted load balancing games on identical machines that do not admit (9/8 − )-pure-efficient taxes (note that this bound matches the upper bound on the price of anarchy for these games [Lücking et al. 2008] ), and unweighted load balancing games on identical machines that do not admit (2 − )-mixed-efficient taxes. Even simple non-load-balancing congestion games with unweighted players may not admit (6/5− )-pure-efficient taxes either. Notice that all our upper bounds on refundable taxes, besides our 2-mixed-efficient taxes with respect to the total latency, use a constant tax on each resource. We also show that the dependence of the tax functions on the weight of the players is crucial when the total latency is of concern, since, in this case, constant taxes are ( √ n)-pure-efficient, even in a very simple weighted symmetric load balancing game with two resources and n players.
We also consider the case of nonrefundable taxes. When considering the weighted total cost, it seems that there is not much room for beating the lower bounds on the price of anarchy. However, we show that weighted load balancing games on identical machines admit (1 + √ 2)-mixed-efficient nonrefundable taxes. This is an existential result since the tax defined uses an optimal assignment (i.e., the pure assignment minimizing the weighted total latency). It can be made algorithmic and yield a marginally worse 1 + √ 2 + bound when the number of machines is constant by exploiting a PTAS from [Azar et al. 2004] for approximating the optimal assignment. This result should be compared to the lower bound of 5/2 on the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria proved in Caragiannis et al. [2006] . Recall that the price of anarchy of weighted congestion games is unbounded when the total latency is of concern. Somehow surprisingly, we show that any congestion game admits 4-mixed-efficient nonrefundable taxes with respect to the total latency. Furthermore, (6 + )-mixed-efficient nonrefundable taxes for these games can be computed in polynomial time. Here, we exploit semi-pure assignments with particular properties that are obtained by rounding the fractional solutions of a convex quadratic program to half-integral ones. The use of convex quadratic programming is motivated by Azar and Epstein [2005a] where integral solutions of such programs have been used to approximate scheduling on unrelated machines. However, we rarely need integrality; even fractional or half-integral solutions suffice in order to compute taxes. For the analysis of the upper bounds, we develop and use two inequalities that characterize Nash equilibria of congestion games with taxes. Some details related to the extended game as well as convex quadratic programs are presented in Section 2. The results on refundable and non-refundable taxes are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We conclude with open problems in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We begin with some preliminary definitions and proofs that will be useful in the next sections. In Section 2.1, we show that the extended games derived by the introduction of any tax function in a weighted linear congestion game always have pure Nash equilibria. We also present equivalent expressions for the (weighted) total latency of assignments. In Section 2.2, we present two inequalities that characterize Nash equilibria of the extended game. In Section 2.3, we present a preliminary discussion on convex quadratic programming; solutions of particular convex quadratic programs are later used in Sections 3.1 and 4 in order to compute efficient taxes. 
EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA AND SOCIAL COST. For a weighted linear congestion game
and a tax function δ, the extended game ( , δ) can be seen as a congestion game with player-specific latency functions [Gairing et al. 2006; Milchtaich 1996] . However, by a simple reduction of the extended game to a standard congestion game (i.e., without taxes) we can show that the extended game always has a pure Nash equilibrium and hence pure-efficient taxes are well defined.
We now describe this reduction. The new congestion game consists of the resources (together with the latency functions) and the players (together with their weights) of the extended game, and, furthermore, for every resource e and player i, there exists an additional resource r e,i with latency function r e,i (w i ) = δ e (w i ). For each player i and each action p ∈ P i of the extended game ( , δ), we create a new action p = ∪ e∈ p {e, r e,i }. It is not hard to verify that the cost of player i under any assignment of the new game is the same as the cost that i experiences under the corresponding assignment of the extended game ( , δ). Since the new game is a standard congestion game, it is bound to admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium and, therefore, so does the extended game.
LEMMA 2.1. Given any linear congestion game and any tax function δ, the extended game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
In our proofs, we use the equivalent expressions of the (weighted) total cost of assignments in the extended game given in the next claim. PROOF. For each resource e, given an assignment y, let Y e be the random variable that denotes the load on resource e, Y ie be the random variable denoting whether player i uses resource e, and Y i p be the random variable denoting whether player i follows action p.
By the definitions, we have
and
We will work with the four terms in the right side of these equalities separately. We have Recall that given two random variables Z and H that can be expressed as a sum of the same number of random variables Z = i Z i and H = i H i such that Z i and H j are independent when i = j (i.e., their covariance is 0), we have that 
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Now, putting together (3), (5), and (7) in the right-hand side of (1) we obtain the desired expression for W (y; , δ) and putting together (4), (6), and (8), we obtain the desired expression for T (y; , δ).
CHARACTERISTIC INEQUALITIES.
In our analysis, we use the two inequalities stated in the following, which characterize Nash equilibria of the extended game. Although complicated at first glance, when examined carefully (and together with the expressions in Claim 2.2), these inequalities provide insight about how efficient taxes should look like. 
PROOF. For each resource e, given a Nash equilibrium y, let Y e be the random variable that denotes the load on resource e and let Y ie be the random variable denoting whether player i uses resource e. For any possible action p ∈ P i of player i, let z p be the strategy of player i in which she selects action p (i.e., z 
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Since y is an equilibrium, player i has no incentive to move to action p, that is, This completes the proof of inequality (9). Inequality (10) is obtained by starting with the definition T (y; , δ) = i (L i (y; , δ) + (y; , δ)) and applying the same properties.
2.3. COMPUTATION OF TAXES. In most cases, in order to compute taxes, we wish to compute assignments that satisfy some property; these correspond to solutions of programs of the form:
where g(x) is a convex quadratic function. Convex quadratic programs with linear constraints can be solved (exactly) in polynomial time [Chung and Murty 1981] . So, programs like (QP1) are solvable in polynomial time when the total number of actions is polynomial. In many interesting cases like in network congestion games, the number of actions may be exponential. In a network congestion game, resources correspond to the edges of a directed network. Each player i has a source node s i and a destination node t i and the set of her actions are all directed paths from s i to t i . Clearly, (QP1) has an exponential number of variables in this case. To overcome this, we ignore the variables x i p and view the variables x ie as flows, that is, variable x ie denotes the amount of flow of player i carried by edge e. For the flows of each player i, we introduce flow conservation constraints on each node of the network and require both the total flow leaving the source s i and the total flow entering the sink t i be at least 1. The next convex quadratic program can be used to solve (QP1) in this case.
subject to
where in(v) and out(v) denote the set of edges entering and leaving node v, respectively (and V is the set of nodes). As in (QP1), for all functions g(x) considered in this paper the solutions of (QP2) maintain the constraints with equality and, hence, they are assignments.
In some cases, we also need the path variables in order to round the fractional solution implied by variables x ie . After we have solved the program and have computed the flows for all players, we can decompose each flow and obtain a polynomial number of flow paths carrying the flow of each player. This can be done by applying a folklore path stripping technique which we briefly present in the following for completeness. We pick the edge e carrying the smallest non-zero amount of flow for player i and compute a path p from s i to t i that contains e and consists of edges carrying non-zero amounts of flow for player i. We set x i p = x ie and decrease the flow on each edge in path p by x ie . We repeat this procedure and decompose all the flow of player i into flow paths. Note that the number of paths obtained in this way is no more than the number of edges in the network since, in each step of path stripping, the flow variable of player i at some edge is decreased to zero.
Refundable Taxes
In this section, we study refundable taxes. We present our upper bounds in Section 3.1, where we first show how to compute 2-mixed-efficient refundable taxes for weighted linear congestion games with respect to both the total latency and weighted total latency. Next, we present a universal tax function for unweighted linear congestion games that is (1+2/ √ 3)-pure-efficient. Results concerning lower bounds are presented in Section 3.2, where, among other results, we show that the above upper bounds are tight. Moreover, we show that besides unweighted symmetric load balancing games, even slightly more complicated linear congestion games (namely, weighted symmetric load balancing games on identical machines, unweighted load balancing games on identical machines and unweighted linear congestion games) do not admit pure-optimal refundable taxes.
3.1. UPPER BOUNDS. We begin by constructing 2-mixed-efficient refundable taxes for general linear congestion games. Given a linear congestion game with latency functions of the form e (z) = α e z + b e for each resource e, we use a particular assignment in order to compute the tax function. In the case of the weighted total latency, we use the solution of the quadratic program (QP1) with the objective function
THEOREM 3.1. Consider a weighted linear congestion game and let x be an assignment which is the optimal solution of (QP1) with the objective function g 1 . Then, the function δ e (z) = α e i x ie w i is a 2-mixed-efficient refundable tax for with respect to the weighted total latency.
PROOF. We will apply inequality (9) for a mixed Nash equilibrium y of the extended game ( , δ) and assignment x. The last term in the sum at the definition of W (y; , δ) becomes e α e ( i x ie w i )( i y ie w i ) and cancels with the first term in the sum of the right part of inequality (9), while the last term in the sum at the right part of inequality (9) We show the following result; the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. THEOREM 3.2. Consider a weighted linear congestion game and let x be an assignment which is the optimal solution of (QP1) with the objective function g 2 . Then, the function δ e (z) = α e z i x ie is a 2-mixed-efficient refundable tax for with respect to the total latency.
PROOF. We will apply inequality (10) for a mixed Nash equilibrium y of the extended game ( , δ) and assignment x. The last term in the sum at the definition of T (y; , δ) becomes e α e ( i x ie )( i y ie w i ) and cancels with the first term in the sum of the right part of inequality (10), while the last term in the sum at the right part of inequality (10) 
where x * denotes the pure assignment minimizing the total latency. The last inequality follows from the integrality of x * .
We note that the above bounds are tight; the matching lower bound is presented in Section 3.2 (Theorem 3.6).
In the rest of this section, we focus on pure Nash equilibria. Clearly, our upper bounds for mixed-efficient taxes hold for pure Nash equilibria as well. Although, we have not been successful in proving better bounds specifically for pure Nash equilibria in general linear congestion games, we show that improvements, either in terms of the simplicity of tax functions or in terms of their efficiency, are possible in some interesting special cases.
In the following, we present a universal tax function for unweighted linear congestion games in the sense that it does not depend at all on the congestion game; it depends only on the resources themselves. In the proof, we make use of the following technical claim. 
PROOF. Define the function g(κ, λ) = ( PROOF. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium y of the extended game and let n e be the number of players using resource e. Also, denote by o e the number of players using resource e in an optimal assignment x. We use inequality (9) 
where the second inequality follows from Claim 3.3. This yields that
As we will show in Section 3.2 (Theorem 3.7), this specific universal tax function is the best possible.
Finally, we consider the case of unweighted symmetric load balancing games and show that we can always compute a pure-optimal tax function when the latency functions are strictly increasing. The statement holds also for arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions; our proof in this case uses a slightly more complicated tax assignment and is significantly longer. THEOREM 3.5. Pure-optimal refundable taxes in unweighted symmetric load balancing games with arbitrary strictly increasing latency functions always exist and are computable in polynomial time.
PROOF. Consider an unweighted symmetric load balancing game with strictly increasing latency functions e for each machine e. Consider an optimal assignment and denote by o e the number of players that select machine e. Let e * be the machine with maximum latency L max = e * (o e * ) among all machines. We define the following taxes: for each machine e, we set δ e = L max − e (o e ).
We will show that the function δ is a pure-optimal refundable tax for game . Consider a pure Nash equilibrium for the extended game ( , δ) and let n e be the number of players that select machine e. We will show that n e = o e for each machine e and, hence, the pure Nash equilibrium has optimal total latency. Assume otherwise and let e 1 be a machine with n e 1 > o e 1 . Then, there is also a machine e 2 with n e 2 < o e 2 (i.e., n e 2 + 1 ≤ o e 2 ). Since no player in e 1 has an incentive to move to e 2 , it holds that e 1 (n e 1 ) + L max − e 1 (o e 1 ) ≤ e 2 (n e 2 + 1) + L max − e 2 (o e 2 ) which implies that e 1 (n e 1 ) − e 1 (o e 1 ) ≤ e 2 (n e 2 + 1) − e 2 (o e 2 ). Since the latency functions e 1 and e 2 are strictly increasing, this contradicts the assumption that n e 1 > o e 1 and n e 2 + 1 ≤ o e 2 . Polynomial time computability follows since optimal assignments are easy to compute through a reduction to a minimum cost flow problem. We construct a network F as follows. For each machine e of the game, F has two nodes u e and v e connected through n parallel directed edges g i e of unit capacity and cost i e (i) − (i − 1) e (i − 1), for i = 1, . . . , n. s is connected through directed edges to all nodes u e and all nodes v e are connected through directed edges to t. All edges adjacent to either s or t have zero cost and capacity n. An example of this construction is presented in Figure 1 . In order to compute the optimal assignment for the original game, it suffices to compute a minimum cost flow of size n from s to t and to assign to each machine e a number of players equal to the total flow carried by the edges between u e and v e in F.
LOWER BOUNDS.
In this section, we complement our previous results by presenting corresponding lower bounds. We begin by proving that the taxes described above for the case of general linear congestion games are the best possible. PROOF. Let be a game with n unweighted players and n identical parallel machines 1, . . . , n, where all machines have the same latency function (z) = z. We observe that the assignment x where each player is assigned to a different machine has W (x; , 0) = n. We will show that for any tax function δ, there exists an assignment y which is a mixed Nash equilibrium for ( , δ) and W (y; , 0) ≥ 2n − 1.
Consider a tax function δ. Without loss of generality, we assume that δ e ≤ δ e for e < e . Let k be equal to n if 1 + n−1 e=1 δ e n−1 > δ n , otherwise k is equal to the smallest integer such that
Consider the following assignment y for all players. Player i uses machine e with probability
if e ≤ k and y ie = 0 otherwise. We remark that y is a proper probability distribution. To see that, note that, due to the definition of D, it holds that e y ie = 1 for any player i. Furthermore, due to the definition of k, it holds that n − 1 + k−1 e=1 δ e > (k − 1) δ k , which implies that n − 1 + D > kδ k ≥ kδ e , for any resource e ≤ k. Therefore, y ie ≥ 0 for all i, e.
The cost of assignment y is
where the first inequality follows from
e , which is due to Jensen's inequality.
In order to complete the proof, it remains to show that y is a mixed Nash equilibrium. Consider the assignment y − j , x j where all players except player j have the same strategy as in y and the probability that player j chooses machine e is x je , with e x je = 1.
The expected cost that player j experiences under assignment
By the definition of k, for e > k it holds that n−1 k
Thus, the expected cost of player j is minimized when x je = 0 for e > k. Since assignment y exhibits this property, we conclude that it is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our next result indicates that the selection of parameter τ in Theorem 3.4 is also the best possible. 
) n−2 z. This construction is depicted in Figure 2 .
The assignment y where each player selects the machine corresponding to the endpoint of her edge which is closer to the root can be easily verified that it is a pure Nash equilibrium for the game ( , δ). Its total latency is
To compute an upper bound for the cost of the optimal assignment, it suffices to consider the assignment x where each player selects the machine corresponding to the endpoint of her edge which is further from the root. We obtain that the total latency of x is
We set k and t such that k + t τ and let α = t/k. Furthermore, we assume that n is large enough so that (
) n−1 is arbitrarily small. Then, there is an arbitrarily small constant 1 such that Hence, W (y; , 0) ≥ (
− )W (x; , 0) for some arbitrarily small . The theorem follows by selecting k and t such that α = t/k ≈ (
In Theorem 3.5, we proved that pure-optimal taxes exist in unweighted symmetric load balancing games. Unfortunately, the next three theorems rule out the possibility of obtaining pure-optimal taxes even in slightly more complicated, but still simple linear congestion games. THEOREM 3.8. There exists a weighted symmetric load balancing game on identical machines that does not admit ρ-pure-efficient refundable taxes with respect to the weighted total latency for any ρ < 9/8. PROOF. We use a similar counterexample as the one used in Lücking et al. [2008] to show a lower bound of 9/8 on the price of anarchy of weighted players on identical parallel machines. There are three identical machines with latency function (z) = z, three light players of weight 1 and three heavy players of weight 3. We consider a tax function δ. Let p(i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, denote the machine with the i-th smallest tax for weight 3 with ties broken arbitrarily (i.e., δ p(1) (3) ≤ δ p(2) (3) ≤ δ p(3) (3)). We divide the possible assignments into the following types (see also Figure 3 ): -Type A: each machine has exactly one light and one heavy player. This assignment has weighted total latency 48. -Type B: one machine has one heavy player, another has one heavy and one light player, while the third has one heavy and two light players. This assignment has weighted total latency 50. -Type C: all other assignments; all these assignments have weighted total latency at least 54.
Assuming that the tax function δ is such that the extended game has an assignment of type A as pure Nash equilibrium, it should hold that δ p(3) (1) ≤ 1 + min{δ p(1) (1), δ p(2 (1)}; otherwise, the light player at machine p(3) would have an incentive to move, and δ p(2) (3) ≤ 3 + δ p(1) (3); otherwise, the heavy player at machine p(2) would have an incentive to move to machine p(1). Then, the assignment of type C p(1) : {3, 3}, p(2) : {3}, p(3) : {1, 1, 1} is a pure Nash equilibrium as well, since the conditions δ p(1) (3) ≤ δ p(2) (3) ≤ δ p(3) (3) and δ p(2) (3) ≤ 3 + δ p(1) (3) guarantee that no heavy player has an incentive to move, and the condition δ p(3) (1) ≤ 1 + min{δ p(1) (1), δ p(2 (1)} guarantees that no light player has an incentive to move either. So far, we have shown that the game does not admit pure-optimal taxes. To complete the proof, we have to show that assuming that there is a tax function such that the extended game has an assignment of type B as a pure Nash equilibrium, then at least one assignment of type C is a pure Nash equilibrium as well.
Assume that there exists an assignment of type B that is a pure Nash equilibrium and denote by a the machine selected by two light players, by b the machine selected by one light player and by c the machine not selected by light players. Since, this is a pure Nash equilibrium, it holds that δ a (1) ≤ δ b (1) ≤ δ a (1) + 2 and max{δ a (1) + 1, δ b (1)} ≤ δ c (1), since no light player has an incentive to move. Furthermore, the following conditions should hold since no heavy player has an incentive to move:
We consider the following six cases, depending on the ordering ( p(1), p(2), p(3) ).
- ( (1) + 1, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, the light player has an incentive to move from b to c and we obtain the assignment a : {3, 3}, b : {3} and c : {1, 1, 1} which is an equilibrium.
-(a, c, b): The assignment a : {3, 3}, b : {1, 1, 1}, c : {3} is a pure Nash equilibrium.
- (b, a, c) : Consider the assignment a : {1, 1, 1}, b : {3, 3} and c : {3}. If δ c (3) ≤ δ a (3) + 3, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, the heavy player has an incentive to move from machine c to machine a and we obtain the assignment a : {3, 1, 1, 1}, b : {3, 3} and c : {}. If δ c (1) ≥ δ a (1) + 5, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, a light player has an incentive to move from a to c and we obtain the assignment a : {3, 1, 1}, b : {3, 3} and c : {1}. If δ c (1) ≥ δ a (1) + 3, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, a light player has an incentive to move from a to c and we obtain the assignment a : {3, 1}, b : {3, 3} and c : {1, 1} which is an equilibrium.
-(b, c, a): The assignment a : {1, 1, 1}, b : {3, 3}, c : {3} is a pure Nash equilibrium.
- (c, a, b) : Consider the assignment a : {1, 1, 1}, b : {3} and c : {3, 3}. If δ b (3) ≤ δ a (3) + 3, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, consider the assignment a : {3, 1}, b : {1, 1} and c : {3, 3}. If δ b (1) ≥ δ a (1) + 1, then this assignment is an equilibrium; otherwise, the light player has an incentive to move from machine a to machine b and we obtain the assignment a : {3}, b : {1, 1, 1} and c : {3, 3} which is an equilibrium.
-(c, b, a): The assignment a : {1, 1, 1}, b : {3}, c : {3, 3} is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Hence, in any case, the existence of an equilibrium of type B implies the existence of an equilibrium of type C as well. This completes the proof of the theorem.
THEOREM 3.9. There exists an unweighted load balancing game on identical machines that does not admit ρ-pure-efficient refundable taxes for any ρ < 11/10. PROOF. Consider the complete graph on five nodes v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 and the unweighted load balancing game having one machine e i for each node v i and one player c i j for each edge (v i , v j ) having actions {e i }, {e j }. All machines have the same latency function (z) = z. Since we have ten players and five machines, in an optimal assignment (see Figure 4 (i)) each machine has two players and has a total cost of 20, while any other assignment has a cost of at least 22 (e.g., see Figure 4 (ii)). We will show that for any tax function δ, the extended game ( , δ) has a non-optimal assignment as an equilibrium. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case and that the extended game has optimal assignments as the only equilibria. Without loss of generality, let δ 1 ≥ δ 2 ≥ δ 3 ≥ δ 4 ≥ δ 5 and consider an optimal assignment that is also a Nash equilibrium.
We first prove that δ 1 − δ 5 ≤ 2. We distinguish between two cases depending on whether player c 15 chooses machine e 1 or e 5 . In the first case, where player c 15 chooses machine e 1 , since the load on both machines e 1 and e 5 is two and player c 15 has no incentive to change her strategy, it holds that 2 + δ 1 ≤ 3 + δ 5 and therefore δ 1 − δ 5 ≤ 1. In the second case, there exist two players c 1i 1 and c 1i 2 with distinct i 1 , i 2 ∈ {2, 3, 4} that choose machine e 1 and two players c j 1 5 and c j 2 5 with distinct j 1 , j 2 ∈ {2, 3, 4} that choose machines e j 1 and e j 2 , respectively. Thus, there exists a machine e k with k ∈ {2, 3, 4} such that player c 1k selects machine e 1 and player c k5 selects machine e k . Since none of these two players has an incentive to change her strategy, it holds that 2 + δ 1 ≤ 3 + δ k and 2 + δ k ≤ 3 + δ 5 , which implies that δ 1 − δ 5 ≤ 2. Now, we prove that δ 2 − δ 4 ≤ 1. Since each machine has two players in the optimal assignment and player c 12 selects either e 1 or e 2 , it holds that there are three distinct players c i 1 j 1 , c i 2 j 2 and c i 3 j 3 with i 1 , i 2 , i 3 ∈ {1, 2} and j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ∈ {3, 4, 5} that select either machine e 1 or machine e 2 . Hence, there is some player c i j with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {4, 5} which selects machine e i in the optimal assignment. Since player c i j has no incentive to change her strategy, it holds that 2 + δ i ≤ 3 + δ j and
To complete the proof, we will prove that the following nonoptimal assignment (depicted in Figure 4 (ii)) is a Nash equilibrium, a contradiction to the assumption that every Nash equilibrium in the extended game is optimal. Player c 15 is assigned to machine e 1 , players c 12 , c 13 and c 14 are assigned to machines e 2 , e 3 , and e 4 respectively. Players c 25 , c 35 , and c 45 are assigned to machine e 5 . Players c 23 , c 34 , and c 24 are assigned to machines e 2 , e 3 and e 4 respectively. Because of the assumption that δ 1 ≥ δ 2 ≥ δ 3 ≥ δ 4 ≥ δ 5 on the tax function and taking into account the load of each machine, players c 12 , c 13 , c 14 , c 24 , c 25 , c 35 , c 45 have no incentive to change their strategy. Player c 23 has no incentive to change her strategy and select machine e 3 , since δ 2 − δ 4 ≤ 1 implies that 2 + δ 2 ≤ 3 + δ 4 ≤ 3 + δ 3 . Player c 34 FIG. 4 . i) An optimal assignment. ii) The non-optimal Nash equilibrium. Arrows denote the strategy selected by each player.
has no incentive to change her strategy and select machine e 4 , since δ 2 − δ 4 ≤ 1 implies that 2 + δ 3 ≤ 2 + δ 2 ≤ 3 + δ 4 . Finally, player c 15 has no incentive to change her strategy and select machine e 5 , since δ 1 − δ 5 ≤ 2 implies that 1
THEOREM 3.10. There exists an unweighted linear congestion game that does not admit ρ-pure-efficient refundable taxes for any ρ < 6/5. PROOF. Consider the following congestion game with 4 resources e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 and 4 unweighted players: two long players, each having actions {e 1 , e 3 }, {e 2 , e 4 } and two short players, each having actions {e 1 }, {e 2 }. All resources have the same latency function (z) = z. Observe that assignments in which each of the resources e 1 and e 2 is used by one long and one short player have optimal cost 10, while all other assignments have a cost of at least 12.
Consider a tax function δ. In order to prove the theorem, it suffices to prove that at least a non-optimal assignment is a pure Nash equilibrium for the extended game.
If |δ e 1 − δ e 2 | > 1, then the assignments of optimal cost are not pure Nash equilibria for the extended game, since one short player would have an incentive to change her strategy. So, we may assume that |δ e 1 − δ e 2 | ≤ 1. Now, if δ e 1 + δ e 3 ≤ δ e 2 + δ e 4 , the assignment where the long players select strategy {e 1 , e 3 } and the short players select strategy {e 2 } is a pure Nash equilibrium for the extended game. Furthermore, if δ e 1 + δ e 3 > δ e 2 + δ e 4 , the assignment where the long players select strategy {e 2 , e 4 } and the short players select strategy {e 1 } is a pure Nash equilibrium for the extended game.
We conclude this section by justifying our definition of taxes as functions depending on the weights of the players. Note that this dependence was not necessary in the tax defined in Theorem 3.1 and is meaningless in unweighted congestion games. However, the tax function we use in Theorem 3.2 (as well as the nonrefundable taxes presented in the next section) does depend on the weight of the player that uses a resource. The next theorem shows that this dependence is crucial when the total latency objective is of concern. THEOREM 3.11. There exists a game with n players such that for any tax function δ with constant δ e for each resource e, δ is an ( √ n)-pure-efficient refundable tax with respect to the total latency. PROOF. Let m be an even positive integer and consider the symmetric load balancing game with two resources (left and right) with identical latency functions (z) = z, m heavy players with weight 1, and m 2 light players with weight 1/m 2 . The total number of players is n = m(m + 1). Observe that the assignment in which the heavy players select the left resource and the light players select the right resource has a total latency of 2m 2 . Without loss of generality, we may assume that the tax is 0 at the left resource and δ ≥ 0 at the right one. Clearly, if δ ≥ m + 1, then the assignment in which all the players are assigned to the left resource is a pure Nash equilibrium for the extended game ( , δ) and has a total latency of m(m + 1) 2 . For any other value of δ, we will show that there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium in which k ≥ m/2 heavy players and λ ≥ m 2 /2 players select the left resource. This assignment has a total latency of at least m(m + 1) 2 /4 and, hence, the tax function is at least (m + 1) 2 /(8m) ≥ √ n/8-pure-efficient. Let k be the minimum integer such that 2k > m + δ − 2. Clearly, it is also 2k − m − δ ≤ 0 and k ≥ m/2. If 2k ≤ m + δ − 1, we set λ = m 2 . Now, the cost of the players in the left resource is k + 1 while the cost of the players in the right resource is m −k +δ. We have (m −k +δ)−(k +1) ≥ 0 and, hence, no player in the left resource has an incentive to change her strategy, and (m − k + δ) − (k + 1) < 1 and, hence, no heavy player in the right resource has an incentive to change her strategy either.
If 2k > m + δ − 1, we set λ to be the maximum integer satisfying | 2λ 
Non-Refundable Taxes
In this section, we consider non-refundable taxes; we first focus on efficient nonrefundable taxes with respect to the weighted total cost. The lower bound of 5/2 on the price of anarchy of weighted load-balancing games on identical machines [Caragiannis et al. 2006] implies that the trivial tax function is not (5/2 − )-pureefficient for any > 0. This lower bound can be modified so that resource removal cannot improve the price of anarchy either. We show that better non-refundable taxes do exist. Here, the corresponding tax function uses an optimal assignment. Unfortunately, even computing an approximate such assignment is hard [Azar et al. 2004] . We can use a PTAS from Azar et al. [2004] to show a slightly worse constructive result when the number of machines is constant. We note that the lower bound in Caragiannis et al. [2006] uses a constant number of machines. We apply inequality (9) for a mixed Nash equilibrium y of the extended game ( , δ) and assignment x. By substituting W (y; , δ) and since δ e (z) ≥ Next, we consider nonrefundable taxes in congestion games. We focus on the total cost objective, since our efforts to design a nonrefundable tax function for congestion games with respect to the weighted total cost were not fruitful. Given a linear congestion game with latency functions e (z) = α e z + b e for each resource e, in order to compute efficient nonrefundable taxes with respect to the total cost, we use solutions to the quadratic program (QP1) with the objective function Ideally, we would like to use optimal pure assignments, that is, an optimal integral solution x * of (QP1) with the objective function g 3 . However, even approximate semi-pure assignments can be used to obtain efficient nonrefundable taxes. PROOF. We apply inequality (10) for a mixed Nash equilibrium y of the extended game ( , δ) and assignment x. By substituting T (y; , δ) and since δ e (z) ≥ α e (2 i x ie − 1)z and δ e (w i ) = α e (2 i x ie − 1)w i for any player i with x i e > 0, (10) 
Open Problems
Our work has revealed several interesting open questions. Tightening the bounds for pure-efficient refundable taxes is a challenging task. In particular, extending the results of Theorem 3.5 and determining the largest subclass of unweighted congestion games that admit pure-optimal taxes is one of them. The candidate class is that of the unweighted symmetric congestion games that include network congestion games with a single source and a single destination. After the appearance of the conference version of the article, Fotakis and Spirakis [2007] have made some progress on this question by proving that network congestion games on series-parallel graphs admit pure-optimal taxes. The existence of efficient nontrivial universal tax functions for weighted congestion games is also open. We conjecture that such taxes do not exist. For nonrefundable taxes, the question whether efficient nontrivial taxes for congestion games with respect to the weighted total cost exist is still open. For the special case of unweighted symmetric load balancing games the answer was recently proved in Caragiannis et al. [2008] to be negative. Complexity issues are also very interesting, that is, given a congestion game , how easy is to compute a ρ-mixed/pure-efficient (non)-refundable tax for this particular game? Our results can be thought of as approximation algorithms for this optimization problem. Although we have made no attempt to formally prove this statement, we strongly believe that this problem is computationally hard for some constant ρ > 1. Another open problem is to prove bounds on the cost of taxes that force at least one nearly optimal assignment to become an equilibrium. This is related to the study of the price of stability [Anshelevich et al. 2004; Caragiannis et al. 2006; Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005a] . Progress in this direction has been made in Fotakis and Spirakis [2007] . Also, having players with different sensitivities to taxes as in the model of Cole et al. [2003 ], Fleischer et al. [2004 , Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [2004] is another interesting extension of our model; some results on this direction appeared recently in Caragiannis et al. [2008] . Finally, it is worth investigating taxes for congestion games with more general (e.g., polynomial) latency functions and for atomic congestion games with splittable demands. Results in the latter direction are presented in Swamy [2007] .
